

~~TOP SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

27 MAY 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: USIB/COMOR (TS) National Reconnaissance Program
Clearances

In response to strict Presidential directives limiting distribution of information on reconnaissance operations over denied areas, the Central Intelligence Agency has developed procedures requiring the Director, (S) National Reconnaissance Office and/or (S) NRO Program Directors to review critically all requests for clearances involving access to projects of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program. These procedures are being followed strictly and impartially.

In February 1963, the Director, (S) NRO concurred in a clearance billet structure for the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance totaling fifty-eight individuals. This total included the chairman, principal members, their several alternates, consultants, and members of the Photo and SIGINT Working Groups. It did not include (S) NRO Consultants to the Committee or representatives to the Temporary Group which has been established to review sanitization procedures.

The clearance billet structure approved for the COMOR was considered adequate at the time, and, from a security point of view has served its purpose well; however, the latest COMOR directory (COMOR D/27/5) proposes a substantial committee membership increase from fifty-eight to sixty-nine. I do not know the reasons or circumstances which prompt this proposal; in fact, it would appear that the recent deletion of the bulk of Department of Defense representation on the United States Intelligence Board might provide a basis for a reduction - rather than an augmentation - of COMOR billets. The attached analysis of COMOR membership attendance over a twelve-week period provides an additional basis for considering such a


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reduction as feasible and practical. In committee activities it has been my experience, and I am sure yours also, that a small membership in regular attendance is vastly preferable to a large group of individuals serving on a sporadic basis.

I propose that we seriously consider a substantial reduction in the existing COMOR membership. Your comments on this suggestion will be appreciated.

Atch:
COMOR Membership
Attendance Analysis


Brockway McMillan
Director
(S) National Reconnaissance Office

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COMOR ATTENDANCE ANALYSIS

9 January - 19 March 1964


1. Only one member attended all twelve of the meetings conducted during this period.
2. Two members attended only one of the meetings.
3. Six members attended only two or three meetings.
4. Eight members attended none of the meetings.
5. Consultants/working groups:
 - a. No one in this category attended all twelve of the meetings.
 - b. Eighteen attended only one meeting.
 - c. Ten attended only two or three meetings.

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Dear Brock:

With reference to your memorandum of 27 May,
subject: USIB/COMOR National Reconnaissance Program
Clearances, I am grateful to you for bringing this matter
to my attention. The question of clearances and the
number of billets is a matter of my direct responsibility,
and I am pleased to note that you consider it one which
must be maintained under continuing review.

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The Chairman of the Committee on Overhead Re-
connaissance has been advised of your memorandum.

Sincerely,

15/

John A. McCone
Director

The Honorable Brockway McMillan
Under Secretary of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

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Orig - Addressee

cc - DCI

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